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Since Octavia E. Butler published her first novel Patternmaster, in 
1976,1 her science fiction and fantasy novels have attracted interest 
from a range of perspectives, including feminist literary studies, 
postcolonial theory and posthumanism. Across the Patternmaster and 
Xenogenesis series, Butler‘s engagement with the gendered 
dimensions of ethical and social obligation has intersected in 
striking ways with ongoing discussions in feminist and postcolonial 
critical theory, while being criticized for its recuperation of 
normative family values and its naturalization of gendered social 
behaviours.2 In this paper, I will explore her complex ethical 
responses to developments in genetics and sociobiology in the 
1970s, with a focus on the ethics of filiation and altruism in Butler‘s 
works, and drawing upon celebratory and critical readings of Butler 
from the feminist perspectives of Donna Haraway, Nancy Jesser 
and Michelle Osherow.  Butler‘s speculations about the possibilities 
of futures based on very different ―humans‖ will then be compared 
with those of French philosopher Gilles Deleuze, whose 
philosophies of biology and human agency, especially those 
developed with Felix Guattari in Anti-Oedipus, reflect similar 
anxieties around the normative definitions of human behavior 
implicit in both sociobiology and psychoanalysis. While it is 
difficult to place philosophical texts in conversation with literary 
works, especially when both authors and their imagined audiences 
are separated by linguistic, cultural and geographical divides, this 
analysis teases out some of the overlapping challenges faced in 
mapping out utopian (or revolutionary) thought beyond the limits 





 For both Butler and Deleuze, the relationships between biology, 
the family and interpersonal ethics are always embedded in political 
problems: what are the basic human needs that currently underpin, 
or should underpin, forms of social organisation? What sorts of 
personal relationships are valued or ignored by dominant discursive 
regimes of social representation? In answering these questions, 
Butler and Deleuze diverge significantly in the emphases they place 
on care, interpersonal dependencies and intimacy, but they do share 
a common rejection of ―top down‖ structuralist explanations of 
human behavior and cultural norms. Instead, the immanent and 
variable necessities of creation and survival, shaped by the 
urgencies and traumas of lived experience, come to the foreground 
as starting points for ethical thinking and living. 
 However, this focus is not intended to minimize the importance 
of the racial politics and colonial ―resonances‖ in Octavia Butler‘s 
work.3 In an interview, Butler offers her Nebula award-winning 
short-story ―Bloodchild‖ as a re-scripting of the early science 
fiction scenarios that modeled themselves on the colonial venture 
(Kenan 498), and a similar case could be made for the Xenogenesis 
series: the key narrative revolves around migrating aliens seeking a 
new planet, but needing to negotiate with disempowered local 
inhabitants, sometimes through force or coercion, the terms of 
their occupation. Nevertheless, an overly allegorical treatment of 
Butler‘s novels risks obscuring her deliberate use of the science 
fiction genre to distill ideas around familial and interpersonal ethics 
that underpin her broader critiques of hierarchical, patriarchal and 
racist social institutions. This paper‘s focus on gender difference as 
an organizing ethical trope in Butler‘s work is thus intended as a 
complement to broader discussions around the function of ―race‖ 
and ―culture‖ in naturalizing and reproducing (sometimes literally) 
wider forms of social injustice and inequality. 
 For Wild Seed, published in 1980,4 much of which is set in 
nineteenth-century Louisiana, Butler drew on both her own family 
history and on African myths, most prominently the myth of 
Atagbusi, which she creatively works into the overarching 
narratives of the Patternmaster saga.5 Although the third written in 
the series, Wild Seed acts as a prequel, introducing us to the ancient 
spirit Doro who kills by taking over human bodies and consuming 
their souls. In Wild Seed and then Mind of My Mind,6 Doro engages 
in a social engineering project, collecting strangely gifted 
individuals, usually telepathic but sometimes shape-shifting or 
telekenetic, and breeding them to amplify their abilities. Doro 
meets Anyanwu, a 300 year old woman with the ability to shape-




shift into any living being, and who like him, is the parent of 
numerous kinship lineages, also fulfilling the role of doctor and, if 
necessary, protector. But her interest in her extended kin is entirely 
altruistic—while Doro seems to value his progeny only insofar as 
they contribute to his prized gene pools and exploits his role as 
demi-God by taking women at his choosing, Anyanwu is her 
peoples‘ oracle and healer, a maternal guardian who frequently 
sacrifices her personal autonomy and happiness for her kin. While 
Doro breeds his people like ―cattle,‖ as Butler puts it (Wild Seed 
200), Anyanwu intends to build a family. 
 After their first meeting, Doro takes Anyanwu as his wife, with 
threats that if she is not willing to produce children for him, he can 
always pursue and possibly kill her own living kin. Anyanwu is 
further bound to Doro through the children she has with him: like 
the female characters in Butler‘s Kindred,7 Anyanwu‘s devotion to 
her children forces her into patriarchal subservience. Most 
surprisingly, Mind of My Mind delivers a plot twist in which 
Anyanwu commits suicide shortly after Doro‘s own death, with the 
suggestion that her long-term enslavement to him has grown into 
genuine feelings of affection. 
 While their respective shape-shifting abilities could have 
facilitated a narrative unfettered by issues of biological sex 
difference,8 Butler uses Doro and Anyanwu to provide seemingly 
normative examples of male and female behaviour that transcend 
historical or social contexts. Over the hundreds of years that Wild 
Seed and Mind of My Mind take place, and throughout numerous sex 
and body changes, Doro and Anyanwu‘s essential tendencies 
towards ―masculine‖ and ―feminine‖ behaviours subsist. For 
different people, Anyanwu can become a mother, an older sister, a 
teacher and a lover, but never a master, trader or business 
entrepreneur. These are roles reserved for Doro and his male 
offspring , like Karl (in Mind of My Mind), who attend to their 
various investments and control people as if they were ―robots‖ 
(Mind of My Mind 291). Butler‘s gender roles thus frequently 
conform to well-established patriarchal divisions between the 
public (masculine) and the private (feminine), or between social 
production, associated with the ―industrial man,‖ and social 
reproduction, associated with feminine domesticity and the 
―maternal instinct.‖ 
 Nevertheless, these worlds are rarely mutually exclusive in 
Butler‘s novels: a key tension throughout Wild Seed, but also 1978‘s 
Survivor,9 is around the uses of the ―political sphere‖ itself, which is 





necessarily negotiated by, the female protagonists. Butler keenly 
explores the power relations between these gendered domains, 
through Alanna‘s pleas for cooperation between her husband and 
her father in Survivor, and in Anyanwu‘s demands for compassion 
from Doro in the management of his enslaved peoples. 
 These tensions find their parallel in the Xenogenesis trilogy, 
beginning with Dawn (1987) and followed by Adulthood Rites (1988) 
and Imago (1989).10 Dawn introduces a strong female character called 
Lilith,11 who is charged with the task of building and sustaining new 
human families in a post-apocalyptic world. The novel begins with 
her awakening on an alien spaceship, home to the Oankali, who 
have rescued a handful of human survivors from a nuclear war that 
has ravaged the Earth. The Oankali themselves are motivated by 
their innate and irrepressible desire to mix their genes with those of 
other species: they ―consume difference‖ by producing offspring 
with mixed-species parenthood (literally, ―xenogenesis‖). The 
Oankali offer the humans little choice but to breed with them, 
having altered the human survivors so they can no longer breed 
with each other. In this respect, the Oankali are highly 
manipulative, using humans only insofar as they further the aliens‘ 
own ends, and forcing them to make an impossible choice: co-
operate or become extinct. 
 The situation of the humans in the Xenogenesis trilogy parallels 
that of Anyanwu in her relationship with Doro—because of her 
desire to have children and have a family, she is forced to 
accommodate Doro‘s tyrannical power over her and her progeny. 
In both these scenarios, there is an underlying tension between 
individual autonomy and familial (and, more generally, social) 
obligation, with the latter invested in primarily by female characters. 
And again, Lilith‘s commitment to ethical personal relationships 
and family are complicated by the political resonances of her 
position as the builder of the new human population, both through 
her enhanced strength (a gift from the Oankali) and political 
leadership, and through her role (literally) as mother of a new 
generation. In this way, the constitution of a new political 
community intersects directly with issues around reproductive 
rights and the role of the family: Lilith is persuaded, if not entirely 
coerced, to have a half-Oankali baby as part of a ―nation-building‖ 
project.12 
 The dependence of political and community projects on the 
familial sphere is most clearly articulated in Dawn and Adulthood 
Rites, when the Oankali decide to repopulate the earth by breeding 
with humans, the aspiring alpha-male Gabe takes his wife Tate and 




a handful of humans to start a Resister community called Phoenix, 
in which, without Oankali assistance, families will be infertile. The 
reader later discovers that Tate wanted to stay with Lilith, who 
chose the option of family—even a mixed-species one—over the 
individual autonomy desired by the men. Phoenix, while initially 
prosperous, is torn apart by a combination of constant attacks from 
male marauders, intent on capturing women to rape and to sell to 
other villages, and their own boredom and despair. Tate describes 
theirs as a ―pointless‖ existence: ―We don‘t have kids, and nothing 
we do means shit‖ (Dawn 185). The meaning Butler thus ascribes to 
human life is thus directly tied to familial relationships and, in 
particular, the kin altruism displayed by female characters. 
 Here Butler‘s humanism also reaches a paradox: by fullfilling the 
basic human imperative to reproduce and raise a family, the 
humans in Xenogenesis must reproduce with other species, thus 
precluding the reproduction of an exclusively ―human‖ biology. 
Being ―human‖ in Butler‘s moral sense, then, involves abandoning 
narrow conceptions of the human as a stable (or desirable) 
biological category. This is a major theme in the Xenogenesis trilogy, 
when the so-called ―humanization‖ or acceptance of the Oankali 
takes place through the forging of family ties. To put it simply, 
being ―human‖ has little to do with ontology (what one ―is‖) and 
everything to do with altruistic behaviours (what one ―does‖), 
which are in turn presented as the domain of the feminine. 
 An influential reading of Butler‘s gender politics is that suggested 
by Donna Haraway in ―A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology 
and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century.‖ She 
suggests that alongside acclaimed sci-fi writers like Joanna Russ and 
Samuel Delany, Butler is a story-teller ―exploring what it means to 
be embodied in high-tech worlds. They are theorists for cyborgs‖.13 
Cathy Peppers follows Harraway‘s reading, suggesting that the 
mixed-species offspring in Xenogenesis provide an image of the 
human being‘s basic cyborg condition, its potential to become 
something else and blur the distinctions between the human and 
the alien.14 In turn, human identity is rendered porous, as different 
conceptions of self outside those naturalised by biological 
differences come into being: children without determinate sex, for 
example, or children with the ability to control their sexual biology, 
as is the case with some Oankali and their mixed-species offspring. 
Like Haraway, Peppers conceives Butler‘s post-human imaginary as 
a challenge to social assumptions about race and gender, exploring 
the potential for differences beyond those recognized by current 





love of the Other, or in this case, the alien—rather than 
xenophobia.15 This reading is supported by the centrality of 
unexpected interpersonal relationships and family structures in 
Butler‘s novels, from incest to interspecies relationships to 
(biological) parenthood shared between three or even five adults. 
Butler forces us to confront normative assumptions about what the 
human body can do and critiques hierarchical, and specifically 
patriarchal, social arrangements as (literally) dead ends for the 
human species. 
 Furthermore, Dawn‘s Lilith is highly reluctant to take on a 
maternal social role expected of her by both human men and the 
Oankali. The ―maternal‖ identity forced upon Lilith, as the 
prospective ―mother‖ of the new human population, is shown to 
be impossibly compromised, insofar as Lilith must negotiate 
between jealous women, domineering men and the omnipotent 
Oankali. Butler is less concerned with whether women should 
adopt maternal roles than with the strategies women develop for 
surviving the demands of a (seemingly inevitable) gendered division 
of labour. For this reason, Nancy Jesser argues that ―Butler 
proposes a world of interaction between the female body and the 
world it is situated within,‖ and links Butler‘s feminism to her 
discussion of Simone de Beauvoir‘s ―situated body.‖16 
 However, in the course of the Xenogenesis series, Lilith not only 
adopts, but eventually embraces, what Michelle Osherow describes 
as the ―Eve‖ function, the mother of all (76). Anyanwu and Dawn‘s 
Lilith and Tate all exhibit ―maternal instincts‖ and a need for family 
rarely found in Butler‘s male characters, and not entirely explained 
by their ―situatedness‖ in their social worlds. Rather, many of the 
key struggles that animate Butler‘s texts are not just between the 
―sexes‖ as biological constructs, but between explicitly gendered 
psychological dispositions: violence against healing, individuality 
against family, social ambition against domestic harmony, the latter 
values held exclusively by women.17 
 As Jesser points out, Butler‘s stories of women displaying or 
adopting certain behaviours in order to ensure the survival of their 
children places her novels in conversation with the sociobiology of 
the 1970s and, more recently, evolutionary psychology.18 In 
interview, Butler says that ―I don't accept what I would call classical 
sociobiology. Sometimes we can work around our programming if 
we understand it.‖19 Jeffrey A. Tucker characterises this as a 
hardware/software approach, corresponding to biology and culture, 
respectively (179–80). In Wild Seed, the challenge faced by the 
offspring of Doro, hardwired to be telepathic and sometimes 




shapeshifting, is to live functional and responsible lives alongside 
other human beings. Those of Doro‘s progeny with the telepathic 
ability to feel someone else‘s pain become their own worst enemies, 
insofar as biological determinations conflict with personal or 
emotional interests. In the Xenogenesis series, Butler provides 
examples of characters ―working around‖ their hardwiring: much 
of Dawn finds both Oankali and Lilith herself preoccupied with 
ways to minimize male aggression and destabilize those hierarchical 
social divisions to which humans‘ own genes have naturally 
predisposed them. 
 Haraway and Peppers‘ alignment of Butler with a social 
constructivist feminist theory overlooks Butler‘s dependency on 
genetically transmittable ―feminine‖ biological traits. Across both 
the Patternmaster and Xenogenesis sagas, Butler naturalises 
parenthood—and especially motherhood—as an essential, if highly 
rewarding, feminine activity. In this respect, Butler‘s position differs 
markedly to that of Haraway, who argues that ―Ideologies of sexual 
reproduction can no longer reasonably call on notions of sex and 
sex role as organic aspects in natural objects like organisms and 
families‖ (61). For Butler, the centrality of ―family‖ is rarely 
questioned, but the political dynamics of reproductive power are 
constantly placed under scrutiny, especially when family projects 
become tied to community building and larger structures of 
patriarchal domination.  
 So far, I have outlined some of the key ethical themes in Wild 
Seed, Mind of My Mind and the Xenogenesis series. On the one hand, 
like Haraway and Peppers, Butler is highly critical any humanism 
that would posit the human body as a stable entity, or that would 
overlook the role of social practices in negotiating the ways in 
which we understand our bodily experiences. On the other hand, 
she commits her protagonists—whether human, shape-shifting or 
alien—to the basic imperatives of family building and reproduction, 
while unambiguously suggesting that those values most useful to 
this endeavour are almost exclusively held by women. In this way, 
she re-instates a familiar dichotomy of maternal kin altruism pitted 
against an almost Hobbesian male individualism. In the following 
section of this paper, I will discuss French philosopher Gilles 
Deleuze‘s ethical engagement with what he has sometimes 
described as ―vitalism.‖20 In doing so, I will point to some of the 
parallels between the Deleuzian and Butlerian critiques of 
humanism and human identity, while also drawing attention to their 
conflicting accounts of morality and, in particular, family. 





interested in the place of biological development, in particular 
neurobiology, in philosophical thought, while careful not to 
reproduce the normative principles of ―social engineering‖ that 
frequently accompany discussions of biology and human behavior. 
Deleuze‘s fascination with non-human becomings and non-organic 
life is motivated by an impulse (inspired by Baruch Spinoza, Henri 
Bergson and Friedrich Nietzsche, among others) to explore and 
experiment with what the human body can do, the unfamiliar 
excitations that affect it and that connect with the non-human: ―To 
open us up to the inhuman and the superhuman (durations which 
are inferior or superior to our own), to go beyond the human 
condition: This is the meaning of philosophy.‖21 In Anti-Oedipus, 
Deleuze and Guattari focus on the ways in which normative 
understandings of the human psyche (through psychoanalysis in 
particular) intersect with wider socio-economic structures, turning 
the body, the family and the wider community into resources for 
ever-expanding cycles of capitalist production. The concept of the 
‗human‘, as it is used normatively in legal, political and 
philosophical discourses to organise social behaviours, is from the 
authors‘ perspective a restriction on the possibilities for social, even 
revolutionary, change.22 
 Moving away from functionalist or utilitarian understandings of 
human needs, Deleuze explores the internal difference of the 
biological organism from itself, its constitutive capacity for 
transformation and infinite variation. This human is defined not by 
what it lacks, but by how it produces its own conditions of 
existence: ―what is missing is not things a subject feels the lack of 
somewhere deep down inside himself, but rather the objectivity of 
man, the objective being of man, for whom to desire is to 
produce.‖23 For Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus, human 
desires are not tied to pre-existing goals, like reproduction, altruism, 
or even self interest, but are themselves productive: what we 
―want‖ is immanent to the act of ―wanting.‖ Human ―needs‖ are 
thus immanent to processes of biological and social becoming, in 
which the terms and limits of human existence are constantly 
renegotiated and rearticulated. In this respect, one might consider 
Butler‘s Anyanwu a surprisingly Deleuzian protagonist, insofar as 
her basic identity is ensured only through her ability to transform, 
to become other than what she is. The Oankali of the Xenogenesis 
series are also prime candidates for a Deleuzian reading, insofar as 
their consumption of difference and commitment to xenogenesis 
makes them explicitly products of difference and alterity, rather 
than identity or species unity. 




 However, while a central theme across both Deleuze and 
Butler‘s work is the embrace of difference, and the ethical 
possibility of going beyond the human to imagine new social modes 
of being, the key moral imperatives at the heart of their writings 
contrast sharply. For Deleuze, the imperative towards exploring 
―new modes of existence‖ does not describe new biological entities 
or family formations, but rather corresponds to the possibility of 
new ways of thinking, with a particular emphasis on the rejection of 
all moral codes dependent on ―recognisable‖ social identities. 
While, like Haraway and Butler, he displays a fascination with the 
possible permutations of the human body, this is intrinsically tied to 
a critique of social or biological identities (whether defined in terms 
of race, gender or sexuality) as the sites of genuine political struggle. 
Butler‘s empowered Earth Mother figures like Anyanwu, for 
example, might be critiqued for their subordination to oppressive 
structures of familial obligation, contingent on narrowly defined 
gendered identities. In Bulterian narratives the feminine Self is 
defined in relation to its Other (either kin or lover), while Deleuze 
insists that revolutionary movements exist outside or beyond any 
fixed categories of selfhood or otherness, which serve to create 
―internal colonies‖ in the psychic unconscious.24 
 Most importantly, Deleuze and Guattari strongly argue that the 
family unit, far from being the fundamental interpersonal structure 
from which social relations are derived, (the ―founding‖ familial 
Oedipal horde is, in this respect, as suspicious as the ―Earth 
Mother‖ narrative of Lilith), is itself symptomatic of capitalism‘s re-
territorialisations on private property and the familial household or 
―domestic sphere.‖25 The moralisation of familial relations thus 
implicitly validates the ideology of ―private persons‖ (Anti-Oedipus 
286) necessitated by relations of private property ownership: 
 
it is through a restriction, a blockage, and a reduction that the 
libido is made to repress its flows in order to contain them in 
the narrow cells of the type ―couple,‖ ―family,‖ ―person,‖ 
―objects‖ ... The persons to whom our loves are dedicated, 
including the parental persons, intervene only as points of 
connection, of disjunction, of conjunction of flows whose 
libidinal tenor of a properly unconscious investment they 
translate. (323) 
 
From this perspective, the scenario presented in the case of the 
failed Phoenix project seems to suggest that liberty and individual 





Other particular to familial relations. Butler‘s characters are 
arguably required to recognise the ―human‖ in familial figures, even 
the alien or the unborn, in the case of precarious pregnancies (see 
Kindred and Dawn, in particular). For Deleuze and Guattari, these 
anthropomorphic co-ordinates of ethical meaning are themselves 
functions of politico-economic relations that seek to reinvest desire 
in oppressive social institutions. Thus, Anyanwu‘s commitment to 
family building could be read as benefiting, rather than resisting, 
Doro‘s financial economies of human production. 
 So what might escaping from closed ―familial‖ (or Oedipal) 
investments involve? Here Deleuze and Guattari‘s narrow 
understanding of the ―nuclear family‖ becomes more transparent. 
Behind the psychoanalytic ―theatre‖ of the family the authors locate 
―an economic situation: the mother reduced to house-work, or to a 
difficult and uninteresting job on the outside; children whose future 
remains uncertain; the father who has had it with feeding all those 
mouths‖ (Anti-Oedipus 390). One might ask what changes might 
need to be made, economic or otherwise, to dismantle these 
―fascisizing, moralizing, Puritan, familialist territorialities‖ (305).  
But Deleuze and Guattari do not put forward an economic 
argument for a re-organisation of the household division of labour; 
rather, Deleuze seems to advocate the abandonment of the family 
altogether. In his Essays Critical and Clinical, Deleuze finds Franz 
Kafka in ―combat against the castle, against judgment, against his 
father, against his fiancées,‖26 as if fiancés or fathers are so 
inevitably and inescapably ―Oedipal‖ that no re-negotiation of 
power relations within the family (nuclear or otherwise) could be 
conceived as possible or desirable. 
 The bind inevitably faced by Deleuze and Guattari‘s critique of 
psychoanalysis is that, while de-naturalising Oedipus, 
Oedipalisation remains the only lens through which the family is 
understood. This leads to a fetishisation of the ―nuclear family‖ as 
the only relevant familial structure in the operation of Western 
capitalism,27 and ultimately depends on the indirect ―evidence‖ 
provided about the nuclear family by psychoanalysts, who—as 
Deleuze and Guattari themselves argue—cannot move beyond 
symbolic accounts of familial structures. While Deleuze and 
Guattari argue against a reading of human pathology in terms of 
the Oedipal daddy-mummy-me triangle, the both the variability of 
family structures and their potential social benefits are given only a 
cursory mention.28 The authors‘ brief discussion of the household 
division of labour involves no reflection on how domestic and non-
domestic labour might be re-imagined and re-organised without 




appeals to essential gender roles or ―naturally‖ gendered instincts, 
so their critique remains at the level of the symbolic—―escaping‖ 
the Father, the Family—rather than at the level of political 
economy, despite their protestations to the contrary. 
 In contrast, Butler‘s characters‘ relations to family are conceived 
more in terms of emotional and corporeal needs than in terms of 
symbolic struggles. In Wild Seed, Anyanwu is both a guardian and a 
healer, possessing special abilities to mend injuries and produce 
antidotes to poisons. In the Xenogenesis series, one of the primary 
interventions that the Oankali make into human social life is via 
their bodies themselves—while partially sterilizing the humans, they 
also provide them with immunities to certain diseases, and remove 
tendencies towards cancer. While Butler‘s attribution of healing 
powers to female characters is frequently problematic in its 
naturalization of gendered ―psychologies‖ and consequent divisions 
of labour, it is powerful in its recognition of care-giving as 
constitutive social practice, one that cannot be simply dismissed as 
historically or ―ideologically‖ contingent. To treat Butler‘s familial 
scenarios as ―symbolic,‖ or even ―determined‖ by political 
economy, would be to overlook the ethical centrality of co-
dependency and altruism in the Patternmaster saga and Xenogenesis 
series. 
 Furthermore, for Butler the distinction between ―nuclear‖ and 
―non-nuclear‖ families is much less relevant than the reproductive 
politics of social organization, whether this be imbedded in 
hierarchical and normative familial structures, like Rufus‘ 
patriarchal and rigidly traditional Southern family in Kindred, or 
more open-ended kinship arrangements, like the communal living 
arrangements of Doro‘s ―gifted‖ offspring in Mind of My Mind. If 
both Butler and Deleuze are interested in what the body can ―do,‖ 
Butler is more focused on what the body might ―need‖ across a 
range of diverse familial and social arrangements. So when Deleuze 
and Guattari claim that ―desire ‗needs‘ very few things,‖29 it is 
worth considering what these ―very few things‖ might be, and 
whether the ―objective being of man,‖ as the precondition to 
desiring production, might already involve basic elements of care 
and emotional support, whether accessed through the nuclear 
family or less ―traditional‖ familial structures. 
 While Butler‘s novels are limited in their dependencies on 
traditional gender dichotomies, she uses her strong female 
characters to highlight issues around personal relationships and the 
practicalities of family and community building. Butler‘s refusal of 





exploration of problems that frequently remain invisible within 
poststructuralist epistemologies. In contrast, while giving lip-service 
to ―family‖ and ―community‖ in their collaborative writings,30 
Deleuze and Guattari tend to elide the wider spectrum of social and 
interpersonal work done between family members, or members of 
a close community, that do not fall comfortably into their analyses 
of the capitalist axiomatic and its familial overdeterminations. The 
crucial task, from Butler‘s perspective, is less to critique the moral 
baggage of ―familialism‖ than to investigate the ways in which 
established social structures and parameters might be reused in 
more ethical, and ultimately more compassionate, ways. 
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